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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
P l a i n t i f f - R e s p o n d e n t , : Case No. 860112 
- v - ; 
THOMAS M. SPEERf : Category No. 2 
Defendant -Appe l lan t , : 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was c o n v i c t e d of aggravated b u r g l a r y , a f i r s t 
degree f e l o n y , in v i o l a t i o n of Utah Code Ann. § 7 6 - 6 - 2 0 3 ( 1 9 7 8 ) , 
and aggravated a s s a u l t , a f i r s t degree f e l o n y , i n v i o l a t i o n of 
Utah Code Ann. § 7 6 - 5 - 1 0 3 ( b ) ( 1 9 7 8 ) , in a jury t r i a l he ld Apr i l 
2 5 , 1985 , i n the Third J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t Court , i n and for S a l t 
Lake County, S t a t e of Utah, t h e Honorable J . Dennis F r e d e r i c k , 
p r e s i d i n g . Judge Freder ick s e n t e n c e d defendant t o the Utah S t a t e 
Pr i son on May 2 0 , 1 9 8 5 , t o f i v e y e a r s t o l i f e for aggravated 
burg lary , one year for the use of a f i rearm and z e r o t o f i v e 
y e a r s for aggravated a s s a u l t . A s t a y of commitment t o t h e p r i s o n 
was granted pending h i s Motion for New T r i a l . The Motion f o r New 
Tr ia l was heard and denied on January 8 , 1 9 8 6 . This Court 
granted d e f e n d a n t ' s motion for a c e r t i f i c a t e of probable cause on 
August 1 1 , 1 9 8 6 . 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
At 9:00 a.m. on February 13, 1985, Sharon Speer heard 
noises in her home (R. 407). Thinking that her daughter Tracy 
had returned home, she slipped on her robe and started out of the 
bathroom (R. 407) • She was confronted by her estranged husband, 
the defendant, carrying a shotgun, a roll of electrical tape and 
a bottle of vodka (R. 408). She asked defendant what he was 
doing. Receiving no answer, she tried to get past him (R. 409), 
but he shoved her to the floor (R. 409). 
Defendant appeared to be sober to Ms. Speer (R. 409). 
When she asked himt why he was doing this to her, he replied, 
"This is going to be our last day together," and added that he 
had this all planned out (R. 411). He said that if she had any 
appointments scheduled that day she should cancel them, as she 
was going to spend that last day with him (R. 411). 
The phone rang and defendant allowed Ms. Speer to 
answer it (R. 411). She recognized the voice as a friend of 
defendants and attempted to hand the phone to defendant (R. 412-
414). He grabbed it out of her hand and threw it across the room 
(R. 414). He knocked Ms. Speer up against a chest of drawers 
causing a scrape to her nose and knocking the wind out of her (R. 
414). He began to tape her wrists together (R. 414, 415). She 
pled with him not to tape her and promised to do anything he 
wished (R. 415). Defendant then pulled her to her feet, saying 
they were going to go downstairs and lock up the house (R. 418). 
He took the shotgun with him (R. 418). 
Upon reaching the basement door, Ms. Speer pushed the 
door open and tried to run outside (R. 419-420). Defendant 
pulled her back inside by her hair and snoulders as she screamed 
and fought (R. 419-420). Defendant overpowered her and threw her 
against a washer and dryer (R. 420). She fell to the floor. 
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Defendant straddled her chest and started to strangle her (R. 
421). Just as she began to lose consciousness, defendant stopped 
(R. 422). He pulled her to her feet and went into another room 
to get his stepson's rifle (R. 423). He forced Ms. Speer back 
upstairs (R. 423-424) and began drinking the vodka he had brought 
to the house (R. 423-425). 
Defendant told Ms. Speer that he knew exactly what he 
was doing, and that he had first intended to rape her but had 
decided against it (R. 425-426). Defendant then took the shotgun 
and forced Ms. Speer downstairs to get a cup of coffee (R. 426-
427). 
Returning to the bedroom and placing the shotgun at his 
side, defendant told Ms. Speer that he had thought a lot about 
what he was doing, planning it while he was out of the state (R. 
429). He said he could not live with the torment anymore and 
that everything was her fault (R. 429). The doorbell rang and 
defendant became nervous and agitated (R. 432). The two went 
downstairs and opened the door to two police officers (R. 435). 
Officer Mattfeld testified that upon responding to a 
call from "Welfare", he and Officer Johnson knocked on the front 
door of Ms. Speer1s residence. Receiving no answer, they 
proceeded to the side door (R. 473). He could hear scuffing 
sounds in the kitchen "almost like there was some type of a 
shoving match . . . " (R. 474). Ms. Speer partially opened the 
door. She appeared terrified (R. 474-475). 
Seeing they were police officers, she opened the door 
wide, exposing defendant to the officers1 view (R. 474). 
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Defendant was placed under arrest. During the 
transport to the police station defendant repeatedly stated to 
Officer Johnson that had he known they were en route or that they 
were at the door, it would have been all over (R. 468). 
Defendant was charged with one count of aggravated 
burglary (R. 11), one count aggravated kidnapping and one count 
of aggravated assault (R. 12). 
On April 23, 1985, this matter was heard by Judge 
Dennis Frederick. During direct examination, defendant testified 
that Ms. Speer had turned the children against him (R. 509), and 
upon cross-examination, defendant denied that he had alienated 
the children by his own actions (R. 548, 549). Eric, Erron and 
Stacey Speer were later called by the State as rebuttal witnesses 
and testified as to their relationship with defendant. 
Defendant was convicted of aggravated burglary and 
aggravated assault. He was sentenced to five years to life for 
aggravated burglary, one year for the use of a firearm and zero 
to five years for aggravated assault. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The lower court properly admitted the rebuttal 
testimony of Eric and Erron Speer as impeachment by contradiction 
testimony. Because defendant claimed that he would not hurt the 
victim and further testified that the victim turned Eric and 
Erron Speer against the defendant, defendants intent and his 
credibility were essential issues in the case. 
Because defendant failed to object to the reassignment 
of judges and has not shown that the result of the trial would 
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have been d i f f e r e n t i f Judge Hansen had h e a r d t h e c a s e , t h i s 
Cour t s h o u l d not c o n s i d e r t h i s i s s u e on a p p e a l . 
Defendan t h a s f a i l e d t o e s t a b l i s h t h a t he was d e n i e d 
e f f e c t i v e a s s i s t a n c e of c o u n s e l . Defendan t h a s m e r e l y s p e c u l a t e d 
t h a t t h e r e s u l t of h i s t r i a l would have been d i f f e r e n t i f h i s 
a t t o r n e y had compl ied w i t h h i s w i s h e s . 
The e v i d e n c e p r e s e n t e d a t t r i a l d i d n o t w a r r a n t a j u r y 
i n s t r u c t i o n on t h e o f f e n s e s of s i m p l e a s s a u l t and s i m p l e 
b u r g l a r y . The t r i a l c o u r t p r o p e r l y r e f u s e d t o g i v e such 
i n s t r u c t i o n s . 
The p r o s e c u t o r d i d n o t engage i n m i s c o n d u c t d u r i n g h i s 
c r o s s - e x a m i n a t i o n of d e f e n d a n t b e c a u s e many of t h e i s s u e s 
a d d r e s s e d on c r o s s - e x a m i n a t i o n were r a i s e d by d e f e n d a n t on h i s 
d i r e c t e x a m i n a t i o n . 
The t r i a l c o u r t p r o p e r l y i n s t r u c t e d t h e j u r y under 
S t a t e ex r e l . McElhaney, 579 P.2d 328 (Utah 1978) t h a t a g g r a v a t e d 
a s s a u l t c o u l d be commit ted by r e c k l e s s c o n d u c t . 
Defendan t r e c e i v e d t i m e l y n o t i c e i n t h e amended 
i n f o r m a t i o n of t h e S t a t e ' s i n t e n t t o invoke t h e enhancement 
s t a t u t e . 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ALLOWED THE REBUTTAL 
TESTIMONY OF ERIC AND ERRON SPEER. 
Defendant c o n t e n d s t h a t t h e t e s t i m o n y of d e f e n d a n t ' s 
s t e p s o n s , E r i c and E r r o n , was improper impeachment t e s t i m o n y in 
t h a t i t r e l a t e d t o a c o l l a t e r a l m a t t e r and was p r e j u d i c i a l t o 
d e f e n d a n t . E r i c and E r r o n Speer t e s t i f i e d t h a t d e f e n d a n t 
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physically abused them while they were living with defendant and 
their mother (R. 681-702). The State offered their testimony to 
contradict defendant's statement on direct that the victim, 
Sharon Speer, had turned the boys against him. 
This Court has stated that it will not interfere with a 
trial court's ruling on evidentiary matters unless it clearly 
appears that the court so abused its discretion that there is a 
likelihood that injustice resulted. State v. McClain, 706 P.2d 
603 (Utah 1985). Furthermore, the admission of rebuttal 
testimony is subject to the sound discretion of the trial court. 
United States v. Perez, 491 F.2d 167 (9th Cir.), cert, denied, 
419 U.S. 858 (1974). 
Initially, it is important to note that individual 
rules of evidence should not be read in isolation. The trial 
court must consider not only the need to produce probative 
evidence of material issues, but also the goal of ascertaining 
the truth in judicial proceedings. United States v. Smith 
Grading and Paving, Inc., 760 F.2d 527 (4th Cir.), cert, denied, 
106 S. Ct. 524 (1985). See also Utah R. Evid. 102 (Supp. 1986). 
The testimony of Eric and Erron Speer was properly 
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admissible as impeachment by "contradiction evidence,"* 
Impeachment by contradict ion or s p e c i f i c error i s a technique 
wel l -recognized by which s p e c i f i c errors in the witness 1 
testimony are brought to the a t t en t ion of the t r i e r of f a c t . 
Impeachment by contradict ion r e s t s on the inference that i f the 
wi tness made a mistake on one f a c t , perhaps he made mistakes on 
other f a c t s , Weinstein & Burger, Evidence § 607(05) ( c i t a t i o n s 
omitted) . 
However, to permit impeachment about extraneous or 
• c o l l a t e r a l " f a c t s that are material only for t e s t i n g the witness 
i s not pract ica l in that the impeachment may resu l t in surprise 
to the defendant, confusion to the jury, and a waste of time. 
McCormick, Evidence § 47 at 110 (3d e d . ) • The fac tors of 
confusion, prejudice and waste of time are the fac tors which Utah 
R. Evid. 403 (Supp. 1986) d i r e c t s courts to consider in 
determining whether otherwise relevant evidence should be 
1 McCormick, Evidence § 47 at 109 (3d ed. ) provides an example of 
impeachment by contradic t ion: 
"Contradiction" may be explained as fo l lows . 
Statements are e l i c i t e d from Witness One, who 
has t e s t i f i e d t o a material story of an 
acc ident , crime, or other matters, to the 
e f f ec t that at the time he witnessed these 
matters the day was windy and cold and he, 
the wi tness , was wearing h i s green sweater. 
Let us suppose these l a t t e r statements about 
the day and the sweater to be "disproved." 
This may happen in several ways. Witness One 
on direct or cross-examination may acknowledge 
that he was in error. Or j u d i c i a l not i ce may 
be taken that at the time and place i t could 
not have been cold and windy, e . g . , in Tucson 
in July . But commonly disproof or "contradiction" 
i s attempted by c a l l i n g Witness Two to t e s t i f y 
to the contrary, i . e . , that the day was warm 
and Witness One was in h i s s h i r t - s l e e v e s . 
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excluded. Application of Rule 403 to impeachment by 
contradiction requires courts to exclude the proffered 
impeachment if its probative value was substantially outweighed 
by these factors. Thus, the introduction of contradiction 
testimony should be left to the sound discretion of the trial 
judge. Weinstein £> Burger, Evidence § 607(05) at 607-62; 
McCormick, Evidence S 47 at 113 (3d ed.). See also United States 
v. Batts, 573 F.2d 599 (9th Cir. 1978). 
This Court defined a "collateral" matter in State v. 
Mitchell, 571 P.2d 1351 (Utah 1977): 
. . . It is generally stated that facts which 
would be independently provable are not 
collateral. Obviously, facts which are rele-
vant to the issues of the cause come within 
this category. In addition, facts indepen-
dently provable to impeach or disqualify the 
witness, whether or not introduced to contra-
dict him, are admissible. For example, 
testimony may be introduced to show bias, 
interest, conviction of a crime or lack of 
capacity or opportunity for knowledge of 
the facts related. 
Finally, a third kind of fact must be 
considered. Suppose a witness has told a 
story of a transaction crucial to the 
controversy. To prove him wrong in some 
trivial detail of time, place, or circum-
stance is 'collateral." But to prove untrue 
some facts recited by the witness that if 
he were really there and saw what he claims 
to have seen, he could not have been mis-
taken about, is a convincing kind of 
impeachment that the courts must make place 
for, although the contradiction evidence 
is otherwise inadmissible because it is 
collateral under the tests mentioned above. 
To disprove such a fact is to pull out 
the linchpin of the story. So we may 
recognize this third type of allowable 
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contradiction namely, the contradiction 
of any part of the witness's account of the 
background and circumstances of a material 
transaction, which as a matter of human exper-
ience he would not have been mistaken about 
if his story were true. 
Id. at 1355 (citations omitted). 
This Court has held on at least three occasions that a 
prior act of defendant is admissible to contradict defendant's 
testimony. 
In State v. Green. 578 P.2d 512 (Utah 1978), the 
defendant denied ever selling drugs. This Court found that the 
State was permitted to present evidence on rebuttal that the 
defendant had sold drugs to a certain witness on a particular 
date. 
In State v. Wells, 603 P.2d 810 (Utah 1979), the 
defendant testified on cross that he had not previously pointed a 
weapon at the victim. On rebuttal, the State was permitted to 
introduce a witness who testified that the defendant did indeed 
point a weapon at the victim one week prior to the shooting which 
was in issue in the case. 
Finally, in State v. Lopez, 626 P.2d 483 (Utah 1981), 
the defendant testified on direct examination that the fight with 
the victim occurred as a result of an argument over an earlier 
fight defendant had with a third party. On cross examination, 
defendant testified that he had not kicked the third party in the 
head during the previous fight. The State was permitted to 
present a witness on rebuttal who testified that she witnessed 
the defendant kick the third party in the head on a prior 
occasion. This Court stated: 
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IU£ the defendant himself opens up t h e sub-j e c t as t o p r i o r i n c i d e n t s f i t becomes sub -j e c t t o c ross -examina t ion and r e f u t a t i o n t h e 
same as any o ther evidence* 
Id , a t 485. 
Insofa r as t h e g u i l t or innocence of 
the defendant i s concerned, i t would seem 
t h a t the q u e s t i o n as t o whether or not he 
kicked Ol iver in t he head a f t e r Ol iver lay on 
t h e ground i s c r i t i c a l . Inasmuch as t h e 
evidence was in d i a m e t r i c c o n f l i c t (Kimberly 
Horrocks t e s t i f y i n g t h a t she so saw the 
defendant kick Oliver twice in the head, 
and defendant denying t h e k i c k i n g ) , i t 
becomes not only m a t e r i a l , but of paramount 
impor tance , t o determine who was t e l l i n g 
the t r u t h . Under such c i r cums tances , t h e r e 
i s no impropr ie ty in r e c e i v i n g evidence 
bear ing upon the c r e d i b i l i t y of the w i t n e s s . 
The r e c e i p t of t h i s evidence of J a n i c e Ortega 
had the f u r t h e r j u s t i f i c a t i o n t h a t i t was 
in r e f u t a t i o n of d e f e n d a n t ' s den ia l t h a t he 
had kicked Donny Waltz when he was down. 
For the foregoing r e a s o n s , we do not agree 
with the d e f e n d a n t ' s claim t h a t i t was 
e r r o r t o admit her t e s t imony . 
Id . a t 486. 
Arguably, the evidence of misconduct admitted in 
rebuttal in these three cases might have been viewed as 
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inadmissible under Utah R. Evid. 608(b) (Supp. 1986) . 2 However, 
i t appears this Court admitted the rebuttal evidence in those 
cases under the theory of impeachment by contradiction because of 
the critical issue of determining who was telling the truth. 
In the instant case the evidence on rebuttal was 
properly admitted under the theory of impeachment by 
contradiction. 
Defendant testified on direct that the victim had 
turned the children against him (R. 509). He related this fact 
during his testimony regarding the marital history of the parties 
and the events leading up to the alleged assault. He portrayed 
himself to be a peaceable man who loved the victim and would not 
hurt her (R. 516, 537, 548), that he had not threatened nor 
harmed the boys (R. 549) and that he loved them (R. 549). 
The testimony on the treatment of the boys was also 
essential to determine who was telling the truth. Lopezf 626 
P.2d a t 486 . 
2
 Rule 608(b) provides: 
Specific instances of the conduct of a witness, 
for the purpose of attacking or supporting his 
credibility, other than conviction of crime as 
provided in Rule 609, may not be proved by ex-
trinsic evidence. They may, however, in the 
discretion of the court, if probative of truth-
fulness or untruthfulness, be inquired into on 
cross-examinationn of the witness (1) concerning 
his character for truthfulness or untruthfulness 
of another witness as to which character the 
witness being cross-examined has test if ied, 
or (2) concerning the character for 
truthfulness or untruthfulness. 
The giving of testimony, whether by an accused 
or by any other witness, does not operate as a 
waiver of his privilege against self-incrimina-
tion when examined with respect to matters which 
relate only to credibility. 
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The victim testified that defendant was not invited to 
the house (R. 405), that he pushed her to the floor (R. 409), 
that he said that this would be their last day together (R. 411), 
that he knocked her against a chest of drawers (R. 414), that he 
started to tape her wrists (R. 415), that he pulled her back in 
the house when she tried to leave (R. 420), he threw her against 
the washer and dryer (R. 420), he started to choke her (R. 421), 
and he constantly had the loaded shotgun with him (R. 426). 
Defendant, on the other hand, testified that he was 
welcome at the home (R. 507, 511), that he restrained her after 
she hit and scratched him (R. 513), he told her he would not hurt 
her (R. 514), he did not strangle her (R. 514), he did not tie 
her wrists (R. 541), and that he did not remember knocking her 
down (R. 541). 
A review of the record in the instant case discloses 
that the defendant attempted to portray himself in his direct 
testimony as a peaceable man who had never hurt his wife and 
stepsons and would never hurt them. The trial judge was in the 
best position to evaluate the effect this mis-painted picture had 
on the jury. By admitting the rebuttal evidence, the trial court 
merely completed the picture as to defendant's true history with 
the victim and her family and defendant's intent. See United 
States v. Batts, 573 F.2d 599 (9th Cir. 1978); United States v. 
Lewis, 700 P.2d 1328 (10th Cir. 1983). 
Even assuming arguendo that the issue of defendant's 
treatment of the boys was a collateral matter, contradiction by 
extrinsic facts is permissible if the defendant has falsely 
stated a fact on direct. Weinstein & Burger, Evidence § 607(05). 
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United S ta te s v. Benedetto, 571 F. 2d 1246, 1250 (2nd Cir. 1978) 
(State permitted to present evidence in rebuttal that defendant 
accepted unrelated bribes in response to defendant's testimony on 
d irec t that he had never taken bribes from anybody); United 
g t a t e s v. B e l l , 165 U.S. App. D. C. 146, 506 F.2d 207 (1974) (In 
response to defendant's statement on d irec t that he had never 
seen narco t i c s , the State was permitted t o introduce evidence in 
rebuttal of another drug s a l e in which defendant was involved) . 
"Once a witness ( e spec ia l l y a defendant-witness) t e s t i f i e s as to 
any s p e c i f i c fact on d irec t testimony, the t r i a l judge has broad 
d i scre t ion to admit e x t r i n s i c evidence tending t o contradict the 
s p e c i f i c statement, even i f such statement concerns a c o l l a t e r a l 
matter in the case ." Benedetta, 571 F.2d at 1250. 
In State v. Panter, 536 S.W.2d 481 (Mo. 1976) the Court 
permitted the State to introduce evidence on rebuttal of a prior 
drug sa le by defendant in response to defendant's denial that he 
never sold control led substances to anyone. The Panter Court 
c i t e d to State v. King. 342 Mo. 975, 119 S.W.2d 277, 283-84 
(1938) s t a t i n g : 
" . . . Undoubtedly, where there is evidence 
to support a charge that the accused committed 
statutory rape, proof that he had recently 
theretofore perpetrated the same or other like 
degenerate acts upon other female children of 
tender years would be corroborative, just as 
proof of his prior good character would tend 
to repel the charge. And although such proof 
cannot be introduced by the State to help out 
its case in chief, yet we think it should be 
allowed to do so in rebuttal when the defense 
initially has made a showing on that question. 
Certainly the accused ought not to be 
permitted to tender the issue and gain the 
benefit of so doing, and then contend there 
is no such issue, or that the question is 
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immaterial, when the prosecution offers to 
meet it. It would be like letting the defen-
dant put his character in issue and then 
denying to the State the right to introduce 
evidence to the contrary, 
Panter, 536 S.W.2d at 485. 
Finally,, the United Supreme Court commented on t h i s 
i s s u e in Walden v. United S t a t e s , 347 U.S. 62 , 65 (1953): 
Take the present s i t u a t i o n . Of h i s own 
accord, the defendant went beyond a mere 
denial of complicity in the crimes of 
which he was charged and made the sweeping 
claim that he had never dealt in or 
possessed any narco t i c s . Of course, the 
Const i tut ion guarantees a defendant the 
f u l l e s t opportunity to meet the accu-
sat ion against him. He must be free to 
deny a l l the elements of the case against 
him without thereby giving leave to the 
Government to introduce by way of rebuttal 
evidence i l l e g a l l y secured by i t , and 
therefore not ava i lab le for i t s case in 
chief . Beyond that , however, there i s 
hardly j u s t i f i c a t i o n for l e t t i n g the defen-
dant a f f i rmat ive ly resort to perjurious 
testimony in re l iance on the Government's 
d i s a b i l i t y to challenge h i s c r e d i b i l i t y . 
In the ins tant case the probative value of the 
testimony on rebuttal far outweighed any prejudice of the p a r t i e s 
(See supra p. 11 for f a c t s that the testimony was d i r e c t l y 
opposi te) and the impeachment evidence was thus properly 
admitted. 
Although defendant was not charged with aggravated 
a s s a u l t of the boys, h i s treatment of them was a part of h i s 
defense as t o h i s character and i n t e n t . Thus, the rebuttal 
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testimony was also admissible under Utah R. Evid. 404^ and 4054 
(Supp. 1986). 
In the instant case the defendant placed his character 
in issue by attempting to paint himself as a loving husband and 
father who would never hurt his wife or children. If the lower 
court had let defendant's testimony stand without any rebuttal, 
defendant certainly could have led the jury to believe that 
because he had never hurt his wife or children in the past, that 
he could not have committed the crimes charged against him. See 
State v. Fraver, 17 Utah 2d 268, 409 P.2d 968 (Utah 1966); State 
United States v. Lewis, 700 P.2d 1328 (10th Cir. 1983); State v. 
Petrizello, 250 N.W.2d 682, 685 (So. Dak. 1977). Because 
defendant offered evidence as to his character in his direct 
testimony, the State was entitled to rebut the character evidence 
offered by the defendant. Rule 405(b). Thus, the trial court 
did not err in permitting the State to introduce rebuttal 
evidence as to defendant's character. 
Defendant does not argue that the rebuttal testimony 
was inadmissible under Utah R. Evid. 608(b) (Supp. 1986). 
Assuming Rule 608(b) is applicable to the instant case, the lower 
court was faced with a confrontation between Rule 608, Rules 404 
and 405 and Rule 102. Faced with a similar problem in United 
3 Rule 404(a)(1) provides that once the defendant has offered 
evidence as to his character, the State may offer evidence to 
rebut the same. 
Rule 404(b) provides that evidence of other acts is admissible 
for such purposes as to establish intent, absence of mistake or 
accident, among others. See Addendum A. 
4
 Rule 405 provides that proof of character may be made by 
specific instances of conduct in cases in which character is an 
essential element of a defense. See Addendum A. 
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S t a t e s v. gmith Grading and paving, Inc. , 760 F.2d 527 (4th 
C i r . ) , c er t , denied, 106 S. Ct. 524 (1985), the court there 
s ta ted that "Rule 608(b) should not be read so broadly as to 
disal low the presentat ion of e x t r i n s i c evidence that i s probative 
of a material i ssue in a case ." J_d. at 531. Thus, the Smith 
court held that evidence of defendant's e a r l i e r bid rigging was 
admissible under Rule 404(b) . gee a l so United S t a t e s v. Abely 
469 U.S. 4 5 , 56 (1984) ( t h e r e i s no r u l e of e v i d e n c e which 
p r o v i d e s t h a t t e s t imony a d m i s s i b l e for one purpose and 
i n a d m i s s i b l e for another purpose i s thereby rendered 
i n a d m i s s i b l e ) . 
In t h e i n s t a n t case the defendant p laced h i s c h a r a c t e r 
and i n t e n t i n i s s u e and thus the r e b u t t a l t e s t i m o n y , a l though 
arguably i n a d m i s s i b l e under 6 0 8 ( b ) , was a d m i s s i b l e under R u l e s 
404 and 405 . Further , the r e b u t t a l t e s t i m o n y was a d m i s s i b l e 
under Rule 102 as e s s e n t i a l ev idence i n a s s i s t i n g t h e jury t o 
o b t a i n the t r u t h . 
POINT I I 
DEFENDANT'S FAILURE TO OBJECT TO THE CHANGE OF 
JUDGES PRECLUDES HIS CHALLENGING IT FOR THE 
FIRST TIME ON APPEAL. 
Defendant c l a i m s t h a t he was denied due p r o c e s s because 
h i s c a s e was r e a s s i g n e d from Judge Hansen t o Judge Freder ick 
wi thout t h e o p p o r t u n i t y for defendant t o be heard on t h e s u b j e c t . 
D e f e n d a n t ' s f a i l u r e t o t i m e l y o b j e c t below t o t h e 
t r a n s f e r of j u d g e s p r e c l u d e s h i s r a i s i n g t h i s i s s u e for t h e f i r s t 
time on a p p e a l . Utah R. Crim. P. 1 2 ( d ) , Utah Code Ann. S 7 7 - 3 5 -
12d ( 1 9 8 2 ) ; S t a t e v . S t e g g e l l , 660 P.2d 252 (Utah 1 9 8 3 ) , S t a t e v . 
B a r e l l a , 714 P.2d 287 (Utah 1 9 8 6 ) . 
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Although defendant argues that he filed an affidavit of 
bias or prejudice against Judge Frederick (App. Br, 8, R. 198-
203); the record reflects that the affidavit was filed after 
trial, and that the defendant further withdrew it (R. 212-213). 
Because defendant fails to provide any legal analysis 
or authority to support his argument, this Court need not address 
this issue. State v. Amiconef 689 P.2d 1341r 1344 (Utah 1984). 
Defendant has merely asserted, without any proof, that he was 
denied due process. 
Finally, any error the lower court made in not holding 
a hearing on the transfer of judges would be reversible only if a 
review of the record persuades this Court that without the error 
there was "a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable result for 
the defendant." Citations omitted. State v. Fontana, 680 P.2d 
1042, 1048 (Utah 1984). £ee also Utah R. Crim. P. 30(a), Utah 
Code Ann. S 77-35-30(a) (1982). Because defendant has failed to 
prove a likelihood of a favorable result if Judge Hansen had 
heard the case, this Court should not consider his claim. 
POINT III 
DEFENDANT HAS FAILED TO ESTABLISH THAT 
HIS COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE. 
Defendant al leges his counsel was ineffect ive , and thus 
he was denied a fair t r i a l . Specif ical ly , he claims three errors 
to demonstrate defense counsel's alleged deficient performance: 
(1) counsel failed to request a lesser included jury instruction 
on simple assault and burglary, (2) counsel neglected to call 
witnesses on defendants behalf to tes t i fy to defendant's 
cred ib i l i ty , (3) counsel had no authority without the permission 
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of defendant, to s t i p u l a t e to the continuance of a case wherein 
defendant was charged with entering Sharon Speer 's home and 
destroying her c lo th ing . 
Defendant, in order to prove i n e f f e c t i v e a s s i s tance of 
counsel , "has the burden to demonstrate that counse l ' s 
representat ion f a l l s below an objec t ive standard of 
reasonableness ." S ta te v. Frame, 723 P.2d 410 (Utah 1986) , 
c i t i n g Cordianna v. Morris, 660 P.2d 1101 (Utah 1983) . Defendant 
must a lso prove that s p e c i f i c , i d e n t i f i e d a c t s or omission f a l l 
outside the wide range of profes s iona l ly competent a s s i s t a n c e . 
The claim may not be s p e c u l a t i v e , but must be a demonstrative 
r e a l i t y , s u f f i c i e n t to overcome the strong presumption that 
counsel rendered adequate a s s i s t a n c e and exerc i sed 'reasonable 
profess ional judgment.1" Frame, 723 P.2d at 405, c i t i n g 
Str ickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984); S ta te v. Lairby, 
699 P. 2d 1187 (Utah 1984) . In addi t ion , "an unfavorable r e s u l t 
does not compel a conclusion of i n e f f e c t i v e a s s i s t a n c e of 
counsel ." Frame, 723 P.2d at 403, c i t i n g State v. Buel, 700 P.2d 
701, 703 (Utah 1985) . i d . This Court, in Frame, went on to say 
tha t : 
Any def ic iency must be prejudic ia l to 
defendant. I t i s not enough to claim that 
the a l l eged errors had some conceivable 
e f f e c t on the outcome or could have had a 
prejudic ia l e f f e c t on the fact f inders . 
To be found s u f f i c i e n t l y p r e j u d i c i a l , defen-
dant must a f f i rmat ive ly show that "a reason-
able probabi l i ty" e x i s t s that , but for 
counse l ' s error , the r e s u l t would have been 
d i f f e r e n t . We have defined "reasonable 
probabi l i ty" as that s u f f i c i e n t to undermine 
confidence in the r e l i a b i l i t y of the v e r d i c t . 
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However, these pr inc ip les are not applied 
as a mechanical t e s t , but are guides to the 
ult imate focus upon the fundamental fa i rness 
of the proceeding challenged. The purpose 
of the inquiry i s simply to insure tha t defen-
dant receives a fa i r t r i a l . Consequently, in 
determining the fundamental fa i rness of defen-
dan t ' s t r i a l , we need not determine whether 
counsel ' s performance was def ic ient if defen-
dant f a i l s to sa t i s fy his burden of showing 
tha t he suffered unfair prejudice as a r e s u l t 
of the alleged def ic iencies . 
As s ta ted by the United S ta tes Supreme 
Court in S t r ick land; 
[A] court need not determine whether 
counsel ' s performance was deficient before 
examining the prejudice suffered by defen-
dant as a r e su l t of the alleged def ic ienc ies . 
The object of an ineffect iveness claim i s not 
to grade counsel ' s performance. If i t i s 
easier to dispose of an ineffect iveness claim 
on the ground of lack of suf f ic ien t prejudice, 
which we expect wi l l often be so, tha t course 
should be followed. 
104 S.Ct. at 2069-70. I d . 
In the present case, defendant failed to satisfy his 
burden of showing that he suffered unfair prejudice as a result 
of the alleged deficiencies. Defendant argues that had his 
counsel requested a lesser included jury instruction on simple 
assault and burglary, the trial likely would have ended in a 
different result (App. Br. 12). Defendant neglects to provide 
any legal analysis or authority to support his argument and thus, 
this Court need not address this issue. State v. Amiconey 689 
P.2d 1341, 1344 (Utah 1984). 
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This Court has 
"never held tha t f a i l u r e to make such a 
request (for a l e sse r included offense jury 
ins t ruc t ion) automatically brands counsel 
incompetent in the cons t i tu t iona l sense. 
Counsel need not recognize and ra i se every 
possible objection in order to meet the 
competence s tandard." 
Codianna v. Morris, 660 P.2d 1101 (Utah 1983). 
The defendant 's r igh t to a lesser included offense 
ins t ruc t ion i s l imited by the evidence presented a t t r i a l . The 
evidence presented a t t r i a l in t h i s case did not j u s t i fy a l esse r 
included ins t ruc t ion on assau l t and burglary. See Point IV in f ra , 
and no error occurred in not requesting such i n s t ruc t i ons . 
Defendant next claims counsel was ineffect ive because 
he neglected to ca l l witnesses to t e s t i f y as t o defendant 's 
c r e d i b i l i t y (App. Br. a t 12). This contention i s also purely 
specula t ive . Defendant does not identify what witnesses should 
have been ca l led , the substance of the i r testimony, or how the i r 
testimony was essen t i a l to his defense. State v. Frame, 723 P.2d 
401 (Utah 1986); S ta te v. Lairby, 699 P.2d 1187, 1204 (Utah 
1984). Defense counsel ' s decision not to ca l l c r e d i b i l i t y 
witnesses on defendant 's behalf was defense counsel ' s exerc ise of 
judgment and t h i s Court has held tha t i t wi l l not second-guess 
•an a t t o r n e y ' s leg i t imate exercise of judgment as to t r i a l 
t a c t i c s or s t r a t egy . " S ta te v. McNicol, 554 P.2d 203, 205 (Utah 
1976). 
F ina l ly , defendant contends tha t counsel had no 
au thor i ty , without the permission of defendant, to s t i p u l a t e to 
the continuance of another case wherein defendant was charged 
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with entering Sharon Speer 1s home and destroying her c lo th ing . 
Again, defense counsel on appeal merely speculates that the 
s t i p u l a t i o n "may have injured h i s c l i e n t " (App. Br, at 13)* 
Defendant does not s t a t e how the s t i p u l a t i o n i s even relevant to 
the instant case . Without providing t h i s court with any legal 
a n a l y s i s or authori ty , defendant asks t h i s Court to f ind that he 
was prejudiced as a r e s u l t of the s t ipu la ted continuance. 
Defendant a l so appears to argue that the incident 
regarding the destruct ion of c lothing should never have been 
introduced at t r i a l . I n i t i a l l y , i t i s important to note that 
defense counsel adamantly objected to the introduction of t h i s 
subject (R. 523-526) , thus, defendant has no claim that counsel 
was inadequate in f a i l i n g to object . Second, t h i s subject was 
introduced on cross-examination only after defendant opened the 
door by t e s t i f y i n g that he had no knowledge of a restra ining 
order and that he thought he was welcome in the home of Ms. Speer 
at any time (R. 506-508, 5 2 3 ) . 
In retrospect defendant attempts to argue that h i s 
counsel was i n e f f e c t i v e , thereby denying defendant a fa ir t r i a l ; 
however, a l l of defendant's a s s e r t i o n s are speculat ive without 
any proof of l i k e l i h o o d of a d i f f erent r e s u l t . As t h i s Court 
s tated in Codianna v. Morris, 660 P.2d 1101, 1113-14 (Utah 1983): 
MT]he cons t i tu t ion guarantees criminal 
defendants only a f a i r t r i a l and a competent 
attorney. It does not insure that defense 
counsel w i l l recognize and ra i se every con-
ceivable cons t i tu t iona l claim." 
c i t a t i o n s omitted. 
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POINT IV 
DEFENDANT WAS NOT ENTITLED TO A LESSER INCLUDED 
JURY INSTRUCTION ON BURGLARY OR ASSAULT. 
Defendant contends t h a t the t r i a l cour t erred i n 
f a i l i n g t o i n s t r u c t t h e jury on t h e l e s s e r i n c l u d e d o f f e n s e s of 
s imple a s s a u l t and s imple burg lary . 
The de fense n e i t h e r o f f e r e d i t s own proposed jury 
i n s t r u c t i o n s , nor o b j e c t e d t o t h o s e o f f e r e d by the S t a t e and 
g i v e n by the t r i a l c o u r t . His f a i l u r e t o t i m e l y o b j e c t below t o 
the i n s t r u c t i o n s g iven p r e c l u d e s h i s r a i s i n g the i s s u e s for the 
f i r s t t ime on a p p e a l . See Utah R. Crim. P. 1 9 ( c ) , Utah Code Ann. 
S 7 7 - 3 5 - 1 9 ( c ) ( 1 9 8 2 ) ; S t a t e v. Noren, 704 P.2d 5 6 8 , 571 (Utah 
1985) ( f a i l u r e to object to in s t ruc t ion at t r i a l precludes 
challenge on appeal ) ; S ta te v. B a r e l l a , 714 P.2d 287, 288 (Utah 
1986) (appellant must ind ica te from the record that he made a 
proper object ion below); S ta te v. S t e g g e l l , 660 P.2d 252, 254 
(Utah 1983) (court w i l l not consider i s s u e s ra ised for the f i r s t 
time on appeal ) ; S ta te v. Valdez, 604 P.2d 472, 474 (Utah 1979) 
( ins t ruc t ions not objected to at t r i a l cannot be raised for f i r s t 
time on appeal) . 
Nor are the i s s u e s raised of such a nature or magnitude 
so as to j u s t i f y invoking the pla in error rule given the record 
evidence of d e f e n d a n t s g u i l t . Utah R. Crim. Proc. 1 9 ( c ) , Utah 
Code Ann. S 77-35-19 (c) (1982).5 
5 Unlike the appel lant in State v. H i l l t No. 20978, s l i p op. at 4 
(Utah Oct. 22 , 1986) (J. Zimmerman, concurring) defendant has 
f a i l e d t o even analyze the f a c t s of t h i s case in an e f f o r t to 
seek the benef i t of any poss ib l e appl i ca t ion of the p la in error 
ru le . 
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Although defense counsel did not request such 
i n s t r u c t i o n s , i t i s nonetheless within the prerogative of the 
t r i a l court to submit included o f fenses i f he thinks that the 
i n t e r e s t of j u s t i c e so requires . S tate v. Mora, 558 P.2d 1335, 
1337 (Utah 1977); State v. Howell, 649 P.2d 9 1 , 95 (Utah 1982) . 
However, t h i s i s not to say that the defendant's right to a 
l e s s e r included offense ins truc t ion i s absolute or unqualif ied. 
The defendant's r ight to a l e s s e r included offense ins truc t ion i s 
l imi ted by the evidence presented at t r i a l . The t r i a l court i s 
not "obligated to charge the jury with respect to an included 
offense unless there i s a rat ional bas is for a verdict acqui t t ing 
the defendant of the offense charged and convict ing him of the 
included o f f ense ." Utah Code Ann. S 76-1-402(4) (1978). See 
a l so State v. Oldroyd, 685 P.2d 551, 556 (Utah 1984) , S tate v. 
Baker, 671 P.2d 152, 157, 158 (Utah 1983) . A defendant i s 
e n t i t l e d to a jury ins truc t ion on h i s theory of the case only if 
there i s a reasonable bas is in the evidence to j u s t i f y giving the 
requested i n s t r u c t i o n . State v. Dumas, 921 P.2d 502, 506 (Utah 
1&86). 
In cases where the defense has s p e c i f i c a l l y requested 
an ins truc t ion on l e s s e r included of fenses and the ins truc t ion i s 
refused, t h i s Court has e s tab l i shed a two-step ana lys i s in 
reviewing for error. This Court f i r s t determines whether the 
s tatutory elements overlap and whether the evidence required to 
prove the greater would a lso prove the l e s s e r . S ta te v. Oldroyd, 
685 P.2d at 554. 
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Defendant was charged with and convicted of aggravated 
assault in violation of Utah Code Ann. S 76-5-103 (b) (1978). A 
person commits aggravated assault if he commits an assault and: 
(a) He intentionally causes serious bodily 
injury to another; or 
(b) He uses a deadly weapon or such means 
or force likely to produce death or serious 
bodily injury. 
Assault is defined as: 
(a) An attempt, with unlawful force or 
violence, to do bodily injury to another; or 
(b) A threat, accompanied by a show of 
immediate force or violence, to do bodily 
injury to another. 
Utah Code Ann. S 76-5-102 (1978). 
The State admits that the statutory elements of 
aggravated assault and assault overlap since a prerequisite to 
the commission of aggravated assault is that one must commit an 
assault. 
The next question is whether there is a rational basis 
for a verdict acquitting the defendant of the offense charged and 
convicting him of the included offense. See State v. Baker, 671 
P.2d at 157. At trial, defendant repeatedly admitted to 
physically assaulting Ms. Speer while brandishing a loaded gun 
(R. 513, 514, 534, 535, 537, 539, 540, 541, 547, 562). 
Additionally, there was medical testimony as to the injuries 
suffered by Ms. Speer from the incident (R. 462, 463). Moreover, 
Ms. Speer testified as to being physically assaulted by defendant 
while defendant was branaishing a firearm (R. 408, 409, 414, 418, 
420-426, 441, 444). 
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The evidence o f fers no rational bas is for the jury to 
conclude that defendant committed simple assaul t since defendant 
brandished a deadly weapon while assaul t ing Ms. Speer. The 
evidence, therefore , was neither ambiguous nor subject to any 
a l t e r n a t i v e in terpreta t ion that required the court to ins truct on 
a l e s s e r included of fense . S ta te v. Dumas, 721 P.2d 502, 506 
(Utah 1986); S tate v. Baker, 671 P.2d at 159. 
Defendant's re l iance upon State v. Oldroyd, 685 P.2d 
551 (Utah 1984) i s misplaced. In Oldroyd, the defendant argued 
that a rational bas i s e x i s t e d for acqui t t ing him of aggravated 
assau l t and convict ing him of threatening with a dangerous 
weapon. This Court agreed for the fol lowing reasons: 
Looking at the evidence in the l i g h t most 
favorable to defendant, there was evidence 
presented that showed that the gun Oldroyd 
had was not loaded. The o f f i c e r s a l l t e s t i -
f i ed that the b u l l e t s for the gun were in 
Oldroyd1s pocket when he was arrested. 
Oldroyd himself t e s t i f i e d that he had unloaded 
the gun before approaching h i s w i f e ' s apart-
ment. Therefore, the evidence i s subject to 
the a l t e r n a t i v e in terpre ta t ion that the gun 
was not loaded and was thus not deadly. 
Further, there was evidence that c l e a r l y 
negated a threat by defendant to do bodily 
harm: there was no verbal threat , no 
direct evidence that the gun was cocked, no 
b u l l e t s in the gun. All wi tnesses t e s t i f i e d 
that the s ta i rwe l l was dark. Oldroyd 
t e s t i f i e d that he did not hear the o f f i c e r s 
approaching and did not recognize Officer 
Evans when the o f f i cer suddenly shone the 
l i g h t d i r e c t l y in Oldroyd's face . Oldroyd 
further t e s t i f i e d that he was fr ightened 
of being shot himself . Both Oldroyd and 
Evans t e s t i f i e d that Oldroyd; after 
throwing h i s gun out , said to "go ahead 
and shoot me." Given t h i s evidence, the 
intent to threaten Evans was c l e a r l y in 
dispute . 
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Id. at 555. In the instant case the gun was loaded (R. 475, 517) 
and defendant brandished the gun while assaulting Ms. Speer (R. 
408, 409, 414, 418, 420-26, 441, 444). 
Defendant additionally argues that the lower court 
erred in not instructing the jury on the lesser included offense 
of burglary. Again defendant fails to provide a rational basis 
for a verdict acquitting the defendant of aggravated burglary and 
convicting him of the lesser included offense of burglary. 
Burglary, as defined under Utah Code Annotated § 76-6-
202 (1978), states: 
(1) A person is guilty of burglary if he 
enters or remains unlawfully in a building 
or any portion of a building with intent 
to commit a felony or theft or commit an 
assault on any person. 
(2) Burglary is a felony of the third 
degree unless it was committed in a 
dwelling, in which event it is a felony 
of the second degree. 
Aggravated burglary, defined under Utah Code Annotated 
S 76-6-203 (1978) states: 
(1) A person is guilty of aggravated 
burglary if in attempting, committing, or 
fleeing from a burglary, the actor or another 
participant in the crime: 
(a) Causes physical injury to any person 
who is not a participant in the crime; or 
(b) Uses or threatens the immediate use 
of a dangerous or deadly weapon against any 
person who is not a participant in the 
crime; or 
(c) Is armed with a deadly weapon or 
possesses or attempts to use any explosive 
or deadly weapon. (emphasis added) 
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Again, the evidence presented at trial was overwhelming that 
defendant was armed with a deadly weapon (R. 426, 510, 545) and 
that defendant, while armed with a deadly weapon, caused physical 
injury to Ms. Speer (R. 409, 414, 415, 419, 421). Thus, the 
evidence is not ambiguous that in the commission of a burglary, 
defendant was armed with a deadly weapon and caused physical 
injury to Ms. Speer. Because defendant has not denied his 
possess ion of a deadly weapon during his unlawful entry of Ms. 
Speer's home (T. 510) , or h i s physical abuse of Ms. Speer (T. 
513, 514, 539, 547, 576) there was no rat ional bas i s for a l e s s e r 
included offense ins t ruc t ion on simple burglary. State v. Baker. 
671 P.2d at 159; State v. Oldroyd, 685 P.2d at 555. 
Defendant f a i l e d to preserve t h i s i s sue on appeal by 
f a i l i n g to offer l e s s e r included offense i n s t r u c t i o n s , or by 
providing copies thereof in the record on appeal. Moreover, 
defendant has f a i l e d to succes s fu l l y demonstrate that the lower 
court erred in f a i l i n g t o ins truct on the l e s s e r included 
of fenses of burglary and as sau l t as there was no demonstrable 
rational basis for an acquittal on the charged offenses and a 
conviction on the lesser included offenses. 
POINT V 
THERE WAS NO PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT IN THE 
CROSS-EXAMINATION OF DEFENDANT OR IN THE 
CLOSING ARGUMENT OF THE PROSECUTOR. 
Defendant a l l e g e s that the prosecutor improperly 
questioned him for the purpose of disgracing him before the jury. 
S p e c i f i c a l l y , he argues the fol lowing areas were improperly 
introduced by the prosecutor: 1) defendant's a l leged criminal 
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conduct toward the victim in a separate proceeding, 2) 
defendant 's conversation with a woman who defendant thought was 
having an a f fa i r with defendant 's stepson, 3) defendant 's l iv ing 
arrangement with another woman, 4) defendant 's al leged abuse of 
h i s stepsons, and 5) the prosecu tor ' s misstatement of the law in 
closing argument. 
Defendant cor rec t ly s t a t e s tha t t h i s Court should 
reverse a conviction when an improper question by a prosecutor in 
a criminal case so prejudiced the jury tha t in i t s absence there 
might have been a d i f fe ren t r e s u l t . However, t h i s Court should 
not d i s tu rb the lower c o u r t ' s rul ing unless there has been a 
clear abuse of d i sc re t ion . S ta te v. Hodges, 517 P.2d 1322 (Utah 
1974). As t h i s Court s ta ted in Hodges; 
The c r i t i c a l inquiry should be whether there i s 
a reasonable l ikel ihood tha t the incident so 
prejudiced the jury tha t in i t s absence there 
might have been a di f ferent r e s u l t . Due to 
h is advantaged posi t ion and consis tent with 
his r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s , as the author i ty in 
charge of the t r i a l , the inquiry i s neces-
s a r i l y addressed to the sound d i sc re t ion of 
the t r i a l court . He should view such an 
episode in the l i g h t of the to t a l proceeding, 
and if he thinks tha t there has been such 
prejudice tha t there i s a reasonable proba-
b i l i t y tha t the defendant cannot have a f a i r 
and impart ial determination of his g u i l t or 
innocence, he should of course grant a mis-
t r i a l . But inasmuch as t h i s i s h i s primary 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y , when he has given due con-
s idera t ion and ruled upon the matter , t h i s 
court on review should not upset h is rul ing 
unless i t c lear ly appears t ha t he has abused 
his d i sc re t ion . 
Id. a t 324. 
Defendant's f i r s t argument i s t ha t i s was error for the 
S ta te to question him on whether he ripped the v i c t im ' s c lothing 
on a prior occasion. Utah R. Evid. 404(b) (Supp. 1986) provides: 
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"Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or ac t s i s 
not admissible to prove the character of a 
person in order to show that he acted in con-
formity therewith. I t may, however, be admis-
s i b l e for other purposes, such as proof of 
motive, opportunity, i n t e n t , preparation, 
plan, knowledge, i d e n t i t y , or absence of mis-
take or acc ident ." 
In the instant case , defendant t e s t i f i e d that he 
thought he was welcome at the v i c t i m ' s house, and that he was 
unaware of a restraining order (R. 508, 511 , 514, 515, 521) . The 
S ta te questioned him on cross-examination as to whether a 
res tra in ing order had in fact been entered (R. 519) , and whether 
he knew he was not welcome because of the inc ident wherein he 
ripped her c l o t h e s . Clearly , t h i s l i n e of quest ioning went to an 
e s s e n t i a l element of the burglary charge—whether defendant 
unlawfully entered the v i c t i m ' s dwell ing. Once defendant 
t e s t i f i e d that he did not r ip the v i c t i m ' s c lo th ing , the State 
did not pursue the i s sue and no e x t r i n s i c evidence was 
introduced. F ina l ly , the proof of defendant's g u i l t was strong 
and thus the challenged quest ion should not be deemed 
p r e j u d i c i a l . S ta te v. Seegar, 4 Or. App. 366, 479 P.2d 240 
(1971). 
Defendant's next complaint i s that the State improperly 
questioned defendant as to his conversation with a woman 
regarding her a l leged a f f a i r with defendant's stepson since i t 
made the defendant appear threatening. Because defendant f a i l e d 
to object to t h i s l i n e of quest ioning <R. 530-534) , t h i s Court 
should not consider i t on appeal. Utah R. Evid. 103(a)(1) (Supp. 
1986); g t a t e v. McCardell, 652 P.2d 942 (Utah 1982) . Further, 
defendant opened the door for cross-examination on t h i s i s sue 
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when he testified as to the alleged relationship on direct 
examination (R. 515). Because defendant offered himself as a 
witness, he became subject to being treated like any other 
witness and cannot now complain. State v. Green, 578 P.2d 512 
(Utah 1978) 
Defendants third complaint is that it was improper for 
the State to question defendant as to his living arrangement with 
another woman. Again, defendant failed to object to this line of 
questioning and thus this Court should not consider it on appeal. 
Utah R. Evid. 103(a)(1) (Supp. 1986); State v. McCardell, 652 
P.2d 942 (Utah 1982). Further, defendant has failed to provide 
any argument that without this question the result of the trial 
would likely have been different. 
Defendant next argues that it was improper for the 
State to question him as to his alleged physical abuse of his 
stepsons. 
"A defendant who offers himself as a witness is subject 
to being treated the same as any other witness, including cross-
examination on any matter which would tend to contradict, explain 
or cast doubt on the credibility of his testimony." State v. 
Green, 578 P.2d 512 (Utah 1978). Because defendant opened this 
subject on direct examination when he testified that the victim 
turned the children against him (R. 509), this evidence was 
properly admissible. See also Point I, supra. 
Finally, defendant argues the prosecutor misstated the 
law in his closing argument. Specifically, defendant claims that 
the prosecutor argued that the jury could find defendant guilty 
of aggravated assault without proof of serious physical injury. 
-30-
Defendant misstates the closing argument. The 
prosecutor correctly argued that serious bodily injury was not 
required for aggravated burglary: 
"Now, the next element for aggravated burglary 
then, in attempting or committing said burg-
lary! the defendant either, and then we have 
two different circumstances, caused physical 
injury to Sharon L. Speer, yes, we have tes-
timony regarding that. He threw her against 
the chest of drawers upstairs. He threw 
her against the washer and dryer downstairs 
after he pulled her hair and drug her down-
stairs into the house. He choked her when 
she was on the ground. 
There 's no question about i t tha t she suffered 
physical injury, and that does not require under 
t h i s sect ion tha t i t be serious bodily injury, 
but simply physical injury, which i s impair-
ment or discomfort tha t i s caused by another. n 
(R. 299-300). 
The prosecutor then correc t ly s ta ted the law for 
aggravated assau l t as follows: 
Then we get on to the aggravated a s s a u l t , 
again, remembering tha t the threa t can be 
express or implied, remembering t ha t a s sau l t 
can be perpetrated on the victim in one of 
the two dif ferent ways, e i ther attempting 
with unlawful force or violence to do bodily 
injury, or threatening accompanied by a 
show of immediate force or violence to do 
bodily injury, and tha t the defendant then 
and there used a deadly weapon on or such 
means or force l i k e l y to produce death or 
serious bodily injury, and tha t the defen-
dant did tha t e i ther in ten t iona l ly or know-
ingly or reck less ly . 
(R. 303). Because of the prosecutor ' s correct statement of the 
law, no error occurred. 
POINT VI 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY CHARGED THE JURY THAT 
DEFENDANT COULD COMMIT AGGRAVATED ASSAULT 
THROUGH THE USE OF RECKLESS CONDUCT AND SUFFICIENT 
EVIDENCE EXISTED TO CONVICT DEFENDANT. 
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D e f e n d a n t ' s argument i s somewhat c o n f u s i n g . I n i t i a l l y , 
defendant contends the t r i a l cour t erred i n i n s t r u c t i n g t h e j u r y 
i t cou ld c o n v i c t t h e defendant of aggravated a s s a u l t i f i t found 
d e f e n d a n t ' s conduct t o be r e c k l e s s . Defendant then appears t o 
argue t h a t the e v i d e n c e does not e s t a b l i s h t h a t he t h r e a t e n e d Ms* 
Speer wi th the gun and thus a deadly weapon was not i n v o l v e d i n 
d e f e n d a n t ' s a s s a u l t on h i s w i f e , 
A. AGGRAVATED ASSAULT CAN BE COMMITTED THROUGH 
THE USE OF RECKLESS CONDUCT. 
In S t a t e e x . r e l . McElhaney, 579 P.2d 328 (Utah 1978) , 
t h e defendant argued t h a t the r e c k l e s s behavior of suddenly 
throwing a g l a s s which s truck the v i c t i m , d id not c o n s t i t u t e 
aggravated a s s a u l t . This Court r in a f f i r m i n g t h e c o n v i c t i o n , 
s t a t e d : 
Under 76-5-103(1)(a) the prosecution must 
prove the defendant intentionally caused 
serious bodily injury to another, but 
under 76-5-103 (1) (b) no culpable mental 
state is specified and thus under 76-2-102 
"intent, knowledge, or recklessness shall 
suffice to establish criminal responsibility" 
. . . Therefore, the prosecution needed only 
to prove defendant assaulted complainant, 
and did so recklessly using such means and 
force likely to produce serious bodily injury 
(footnotes omitted). 
Id. at 329. 
Reckless conduct is defined in Utah Code Ann. S 76-2-
103(4) (1978) which provides: 
A person engages in conduct:. 
Recklessly, or maliciously, with respect to 
circumstances surrounding his conduct or the 
result of his conduct when he is aware of but 
consciously disregards a substantial and 
unjustifiable risk that the circumstances 
exist or the result will occur. The risk 
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must be of such a nature and degree that i t s 
disregard c o n s t i t u t e s a gross deviat ion from 
the standard of care that an ordinary person 
would exerc i se under a l l the circumstances 
as viewed from the a c t o r ' s standpoint. 
In the instant case , defendant was charged with 
aggravated assau l t under Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103(1) (b) (1978) 
and was not charged under S 7 6 - 5 - 1 0 3 ( 1 ) ( a ) . The information read 
as f o l l o w s : 
the defendant, THOMAS L. SPEER, a party to the 
of fense , assaul ted Sharon L. Speer by attempting 
to do bodily injury to Sharon L. Speer with 
unlawful force or v i o l e n c e , by the use of a 
deadly weapon, t o - w i t : a firearm, or that said 
defendant threatened, accompanied by a show of 
immediate force or v io lence to do bodily injury 
to Sharon L. Speer, by the use of a deadly 
weapon, t o - w i t : a firearm; 
(R. 12) . 
Jury instruction 24 provided in part: 
1. That on or about the 13th day of February, 
1985, in Salt Lake County, Utah, the Defen-
dant, Thomas M. Speer assaulted Sharon L. 
Speer BY EITHER: 
Circumstance A: 
Attempting with unlawful force or violence, to 
do bodily injury to Sharon Speer. 
OR 
Circumstance B: 
Threatening, accompanied by a show of immediate 
force or violence, to do bodily injury to Sharon 
Speer. 
2. That the Defendant then end there used a 
deadly weapon or such means or force likely to 
produce death or serious bodily injury. 
3. That the Defendant did so intentionally or 
knowingly or recklessly. 
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(R. 108). This instruction clearly tracked the previously cited 
language of State ex. rel. McElhaney. 
The State agrees with defendant that to support a 
conviction under § 76-5-103(1) (a) the State must prove the 
accused intentionally caused serious bodily injuryf i . e . that he 
intended to infl ict serious bodily injury on the victim. State 
in the interest of Besendorfer, 568 P.2d 742, 744 (Utah 1977). 
However, because the State was seeking a conviction under § 76-5-
103(1) (b) not § 76-5-103(1) (a), the State need only prove that 
defendant assaulted the victim recklessly. McElhaneyf 579 P.2d 
a t 3 2 9 . 
Defendant a s s a u l t e d Ms. Speer when he threw her to t h e 
f l o o r (R. 4 0 9 ) , threw her a g a i n s t the c h e s t of drawers (R. 4 1 4 ) , 
at tempted t o tape her hands t o g e t h e r (R. 4 1 5 ) , a t tempted t o 
s t r a n g l e her (R. 4 2 1 ) , and p u l l e d her by her ha i r back i n t o the 
house when she at tempted t o e scape (R. 4 1 9 ) . During t h i s e n t i r e 
e p i s o d e defendant brandished a l oaded shotgun (R. 4 2 5 , 4 2 6 ) . 
B. THE EVIDENCE INTRODUCED AT TRIAL WAS 
SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT DEFENDANT'S 
CONVICTION OF AGGRAVATED ASSAULT. 
Defendant argues t h a t the ev idence e s t a b l i s h e s t h a t he 
i n t e n d e d t o use t h e gun for a s u i c i d e a t t e m p t . However, t h e only 
e v i d e n c e of a s u i c i d e a t tempt i s d e f e n d a n t s t e s t i m o n y . 
Defendant i g n o r e s t h e ev idence which s u p p o r t s t h e j u r y f s v e r d i c t : 
he admi t t ed he took a l oaded shotgun t o the house (R. 5 1 8 ) , he 
pushed t h e v i c t i m on t h e f l o o r , prevented her from l e a v i n g , and 
t r i e d t o choke her (R. 4 0 9 , 4 2 0 , 4 2 1 ) , he c o n s t a n t l y kept the gun 
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at h i s s ide (R. 426) , and he to ld her they would spend t h i s l a s t 
day together and then i t would a l l be over (R. 411) . On appeal, 
t h i s Court must review the evidence in a l i g h t most favorable to 
the jury verdic t and reverse only when the evidence i s so 
unsubstantial that a reasonable person could not have reached the 
verdic t beyond a reasonable doubt. S tate v. Haro, 703 P.2d 301 
(Utah 1985) . Viewed in the l i g h t most favorable to the jury 
v e r d i c t , the evidence supported defendant's convict ion for 
aggravated a s s a u l t . 
POINT VII 
APPELLANT WAS ADEQUATELY NOTIFIED IN THE 
INFORMATION THAT THE FIREARMS ENHANCEMENT 
STATUTE WOULD BE APPLIED TO HIM, IF CON-
VICTED. 
Defendant, for the first time on appeal, claims that he 
did not receive the proper notification required by due process 
that he was subject to punishment under the firearms enhancement 
statute, Utah Code Ann. S 76-3-203 (1978). Defendant also claims 
that no special finding was made by the jury with respect to the 
use of a firearm. 
Because defendant failed to object to the alleged lack 
of notice of the enhancement potential, this Court should not 
consider this issue for the first time on appeal. State v. 
Stegell, 660 P.2d 252 (Utah 1983); State v. Barella, 714 P.2d 287 
(Utah 1986). 
Assuming defendant had timely objected, he was given 
adequate notice that the firearm statute would be applied to him. 
Utah Code Ann. S 76-3-203(1) (1978) provides: 
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A person who has been convicted of a felony 
may be sentenced to imprisonment for and in-
determinate term as follows: 
(1) In the case of a felony of the first 
degree, for a term at not less than five years, 
unless otherwise specifically provided by law, 
and which may be for life but if the trier of 
fact finds a firearm or a facsimile or the rep-
resentation of a firearm was used in the com-
mission or furtherance of the felony, the court 
shall additionally sentence the person convicted 
for a term of one year to run consecutively and 
not concurrently, and the court may additionally 
sentence the person convicted for an indeter-
minate term not to exceed five year to run con-
secutively and not concurrently* 
In State v. Angus, 581 P.2d 992 (Utah 1978), this Court stated 
that the punishment for a crime is not a part of the pleading 
charging a crime, and that an information is sufficient to impart 
notice to the accused of possible penalties under § 76-3-203: 
. • . if it alleges either: (1) that the 
defendant is being charged under the en-
hancement statute, or (2) that a firearm 
was used in the commission of the offense 
charged in the information. 
Id. at 995. 
In the instant case, the amended information charged 
defendant with the crimes of aggravated burglary and aggravated 
assault. The charge of aggravated assault stated that the 
defendant: 
"assaulted Sharon L. Speer by attempting to do 
bodily injury to Sharon L. Speer with unlawful 
force or v iolence, by the use of a deadly 
weapon, to -wi t : a firearm or that said defen-
dant threatened, accompanied by a show of im-
mediate force or violence to do bodily injury 
to Sharon L. Speer, by the_jjse of a deadly 
weapon, to -wi t : a f i rearm." 
(R. 12). The charge of aggravated burglary stated that 
defendant: 
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•caused physical injury to Sharon L. Speer; 
and/or used or threatened the immediate use 
of a dangerous or, deadly weapon, to-wit: a 
firearm, against Sharon L. Speer; and/or was 
armed with a deadly weapon, or possessed or 
attempted to use a deadly weapon, to-wit, a 
firearm." 
(R. 11). 
Because the information in the instant case a l l eged 
that a firearm was used in the commission of the crime charged, 
defendant was given adequate no t i ce . 
Next, defendant complains because no spec ia l f inding 
was made by the jury with respect to the use of a firearm. The 
defendant goes on to argue "• . • unless the information 
presented to the Jury i s c lear in i t s contents of a firearm as an 
element of the crime, ox the jury i s asked to make such a 
f inding, the t r i a l judge should not go behind the jury 
verdic t . . . " (App. Br. at 23) . 
The information in the instant case c l e a r l y s t a t e s the 
defendant committed an assau l t "by the use of a deadly weapon, to 
w i t : a f irearm." Thus, even under defendant's ana lys i s of the 
enhancement s t a t u t e , a spec ia l f inding by the jury was 
unnecessary in t h i s case . 
This Court addressed t h i s s p e c i f i c i s sue in State v. 
Angus, 581 P.2d 992 (Utah 1978). There, the information s tated 
that the defendant: 
. . . assaulted Clyde Davies by attempting, 
with unlawful force or v i o l e n c e , to do 
bodily injury to the said Clyde Davies 
by use of a deadly weapon^ t o - w i t , a firearm. 
[Emphasis added.] 
I d . at 995. 
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This Court stated that there is no requirement that the 
jury make a special finding and in view of the charge as laid and 
the evidence relating thereto, it would have been nonsensical for 
the defendant to request a special finding. The same analysis is 
applicable to the instant case. The information, coupled with 
the testimony by both the defendant and the victim that defendant 
was armed with a deadly weapon make a special finding 
unnecessary. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon t h e f o r e g o i n g , t h e S t a t e r e q u e s t s t h i s Court 
t o a f f i rm the d e f e n d a n t ' s c o n v i c t i o n . 
RESPECTFULLY submit ted Cff day of November, 1 9 8 6 . 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney General 
KIMBERLY K.^ HORNAK 
A s s i s t a n t At torney General 
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ADDENDUM 
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ADDENDUM A 
Utah R. E v i d . 404 p r o v i d e s : 
(•) Character evidence generally Evidence of a person's character or 
• trait of his character is not admissible for the purpose of proving that he 
acted in conformity therewith on a particular occasion, except: 
(1) Character of accused Evidence of a pertinent trait of his character 
offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same; 
(2) Character of victim Evidence of a pertinent trait of character of the 
victim of the crime ofTered by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut 
the same, or evidence of a character trait of peacefulness of the victim 
ofTered by the prosecution in a homicide case to rebut evidence that the 
victim was the first aggressor; 
(3) Character of witness Evidence of the character of a witness, as 
provided in Rules 607,608, and 609. 
(b) Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Evidence of other crimes, WTongs or 
acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show 
that he acted in conformity therewith It may, however, be admissible for 
other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, 
plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident. 
Utah R. E v i d , 405 p r o v i d e s : 
(a) Reputation or opinion. In all c&ses i?» -^ hich e* Hence of character 
or a trait of character of a person is admissible, proof may be made by 
testimony as to reputation or by testimony in the form of an opinion. On 
cross-examination, inquiry is allowable into relevant specific instances of 
conduct. 
fb) Specific instances of conduct In cases in which character or a 
trait of character of a person is an essential element of a charge, claim, or 
defense, proof may also be made of specific instances of his conduct. 
